Latest News:
Icon Books this week publishes a book by Tetsuya Ishikawa entitled "How I caused the credit crunch", which is a semi-fictional account of his seven-year career in structured credit at ABN Amro, Morgan Stanley and Goldman Sachs.
The book is unlikely to be the last memoir of life in the structured credit business, as legions of unemployed bankers look to emulate the successful writing career of former bankers such as Michael Lewis (Liar's Poker) and Frank Partnoy (Fiasco). But it sets a high standard for others to follow.
"How I caused the credit crunch" is both extremely readable and brim-full of salacious descriptions of the seedy antics used to sell structured products. Those two factors are likely to ensure good sales of the book.
But Ishikawa also does a very good job of explaining how the market works to a non-specialist reader through a series of fairly implausible conversations and anecdotes. A senior banker at Vanderbor (ABN Amro), for example, recalls stumbling on the concept of securitisation and regulatory capital when he started a mini business lending money to school friends. However, one suspects that the average reader may have given up on the product details by the time Ishikawa gets to correlation trading and the ABX index.
As the author makes clear in the introduction, he was under pressure to put as much bad behaviour into the book as possible, and the accounts of endless trips to strip clubs come across as somewhat exaggerated. (Though with his biggest client a thinly disguised IKB - a bank which named its series of CLOs "Bacchus" - a certain amount of corporate entertaining is to be expected.) Ishikawa's description of arriving at his New York office at 4am every morning to make endless sales calls to different time zones seems a more realistic description of the drudge of selling CDOs.
Where the book is particularly accurate is its description of the dynamics of the structured credit business. The internal politics within investment banks and the relationship between dealers and investors are richly conveyed. And its frank but non-judgmental depiction of bankers obsessed with work, prestige and advancement make the book a worthwhile holiday read.


It is recommended that you do not log out if you regularly access Creditflux on this computer.
Once you have logged out you will need to re-register by entering your email address and receiving an email from us to gain access.
Click here if you are sure you want to log out.

Already a registered user? Click here to login.

This article is only available
to Creditflux subscribers.
Already a subscriber? Click here.
As a part of your trial subscription
you will receive:


Bookmarking this article will save it in your membership area for your reference at a later date. You can bookmark as many articles as you like.
To access your membership area click here or on 'Manage My Account' located in the top right hand corner of any page. You must be logged into the site to use this feature.
For help, please contact us on
+44(0) 20 7253 9510.
Funny enough, if only we could tell the truth about our balance sheet...then it could really be funny !!!
It will be interesting to see if our "CDO Banker" has had the courage to unveil the "obscure" world behind selling CDOs and other structured finance assets. I suspect not, unless he wants to go to court...
An even better read will be a similarly titled book from an Investor who, like everybody else, was under pressure to perform and who, at the height of the bubble, would probably have ignored risk warnings beyond those impied by credit ratings.
Wow, another sign that the end has truly come.... I suppose the next thing we will hear about is an expose' by a correlation "trader". Perhaps how he hedged an itraxx 3 to 6 with a 3 times cdx 6 to 9!
To be fair, in response to the last comment, Tets claims to have caused the credit crisis in the sense that we all caused the crisis. I feel sure he got bounced into using that title by the publisher!
This should be an interesting read, but to claim to be the caused of the crisis is a little beyond reality. We are all culprits by not educating the investors of the types of risks embedded in these instruments beyond the ratings so that they could have taken the right measures or have an adequate reserves to prevent the balance-sheet dislocation that caused the problem..