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Fitch Ratings says that it is proposing new counterparty risk criteria options reflecting concerns that structural mechanisms based around counterparty triggers alone may not be sufficient to isolate securitisation transactions from the credit risk of the counterparties on which they rely.
The agency is seeking market feedback on the new proposals published today.
The new criteria options aim to address the potential interaction between rating triggers and so-called 'cliff' risk, which has been highlighted by recent bank failures. This relationship can itself undermine the effectiveness of rating triggers as a mitigating factor, as the extent of actions that have to be taken on trigger breaches can further impact the counterparty's credit profile in the near term. Other aspects discussed include 'jump-to-default' risk and the relative ability to replace counterparties when necessary.


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If it is ratings based the triggers are there to protect the investor in the securitisation rather than the counterparty. The classic case is the current one where Lehman has defaulted and various Trustees (BNY Mellon comes to mind) are failing to act under the documents without ridiculous indemnities which essentially means that investors cannot access the collateral and the deals should never have been rated above the swap counterparty in the first place
It will be very interesting to see where this goes. Trigger events are presumably there to protect counterparties but seem to do the reverse i.e. causing a credit problem to become a liquidity crisis. Unless the company manages its exposures in a manner that enables it to mitigate the ratings trigger, the trigger is a very blunt tool indeed. with AIG what evidence is there that they did so mange their trigger exposures. There are similar issues with collaterised vehicles. If a counterparty takes too much comfort from being colaterised he might find he misses the risk of a large and sudden movement breaking the model and leaving him out of pocket 'a la SCA'.